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WHEN LENDERS CAN LEGALLY PROVIDE LOANS WITH
EFFECTIVE ANNUAL INTEREST RATES ABOVE 1,000
PERCENT, IS IT TIME FOR CONGRESS TO CONSIDER A
FEDERAL INTEREST CAP ON CONSUMER LOANS?
Victor D. López*
I. INTRODUCTION
The question of whether interest rates should be regulated for the good of society has been debated by secular and religious authorities for millennia. Plato advocated a complete bar on charging interest, writing that “no one shall deposit money
with another whom he does not trust as a friend, nor shall he lend money upon interest; and the borrower should be under no obligation to repay either capital or interest.”1 Aristotle echoed his teacher’s sentiments, writing in his Politics:
[F]or usury is most reasonably detested, as it is increasing our fortune by
money itself, and not employing it for the purpose it was originally intended, namely exchange.
And this is the explanation of the name (TOKOS), which means the breeding of money. For as offspring resemble their parents, so usury is money
bred of money. Whence of all forms of money-making it is most against
nature.2
Proscriptions against usury and money lending generally can also be found
rooted in religious traditions, including those of the Jewish, Christian and Muslim
faiths. Jews were forbidden to charge interest on loans to other Jews under Biblical
Law3 and under Talmudic Law.4 Christians were likewise forbidden from charging
interest on loans through the Middle Ages both by the prohibitions found on the Old
Testament and by various Canons of the Catholic Church.5 For Muslims, ribā, or

* Associate Professor of Legal Studies in Business, Hofstra University, Frank G. Zarb School of Business.
The author gratefully acknowledges the support of a summer research grant from the Zarb School of Business
that facilitated the research for this article.
1. PLATO, LAWS, bk V, at 109 (Benjamin Jowett trans.)(348 B.C.).
2. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS: A TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT,, Book I, Chapter X (A.M. William Ellis
trans.,George Routledge and Sons 1985)(350 B.C.).
3. 20 HAIM HERMANN COHN AND BEN-ZION ELIASH, Usury, in ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA 437 (Michael
Berenbaum and Fred Skolnik eds., 2d ed. 2007).
4. Id. at 438-440.
5. See 14 T.F. DIVINE, Usury, in NEW CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA 353-54 (2d ed. 2003).
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usury, is prohibited by the Qurʾān.6 It was not until the Statute of Usury of 15457
during the Reformation in England that interest at a rate of less than ten percent could
be imposed without penalty.8 This and subsequent usury statutes did not make it legal
to charge interest, but they removed any punishment for charging rates less
than the statutory maximum.9 By 1886, the United States stood as a nation built
upon strong usury laws, with each state having its own regulations.10 But problems
developed that required states to create exceptions to the usury laws, and within decades, usury laws varied widely from state to state.11
In the United States today, usury can be defined as “[a] bargain under

which a greater profit than is permitted by law is paid, or is agreed to
be paid to a creditor by or on behalf of the debtor for a loan of money,
or for extending the maturity of a pecuniary debt, is usurious and illegal.”12 Restrictions on the highest rate of interest allowed by law (if
any) are generally set by the states. In 2007, Congress placed an interest rate
cap of 36 percent13 on covered members of the armed forces and their dependents.14
The regulation applies to members of the armed forces on active duty and those on
active guard and reserve duty15 and to their covered dependents.16 Congress has not,
however, opted to place any interest caps on the interest that may be agreed to in
contracts involving non-military personnel for whom only restrictions set by the
states of their domicile apply. Whether and to what extent citizens are protected
against unreasonably high interest rates, therefore, is a matter for state legislatures to
decide.
II. STATE RESTRICTIONS ON USURY
Almost all states today restrict the maximum rate of interest that may be charged
to a borrower by a creditor with the maximum rate often varying depending on the
type of borrower involved, the amount borrowed and the purpose of the loan with
wide-ranging differences among the states as to the maximum interest rate applicable

6. 7 FAZLUR RAHMAN,Islam: An Overview [First Edition] in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELIGION 4574 (Lindsay Jones ed. 2d ed. 2005).
7. Act Against Usury 1545, 37 Hen. 8, c. 9 (Eng.).
8. Kevin M. Teeven, A History of Legislative Reform of the Common Law of Contract, 26 U. TOL. L.
REV. 35, 45 (1994).
9. Id. at 45, n.67.
10. Steven Mercatante, The Deregulation of Usury Ceilings, Rise of Easy Credit, and Increasing Consumer Debt, 53 S.D. L. REV. 37, 39 (2008)(referencing James M. Ackerman, Interest Rates and the Law: A
History of Usury, 1981 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 61 at 85 (1981)).
11. Id. (referencing James M. Ackerman, Interest Rates and the Law: A History of Usury, 1981 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 61, 108 (1981)).
12. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 526 (AM. LAW INST. 1932).
13. 10 U.S.C.A. § 987(b) (West 2015).
14. 10 U.S.C.A. § 987(a) (West 2015).
15. 10 U.S.C.A. § 987(i)(1)(A)-(B) (West 2015).
16. 10 U.S.C.A. § 987(i)(2) (West 2015). This section defines a covered dependent as those defined under
10 U.S.C.A. § 1072 (A), (D), (E), and (I) namely a spouse, dependent child under 21 (or 23 if in college or any
age if disabled) and an unmarried person placed under the legal custody of the military member by a court of
competent jurisdiction and who has been in that member’s custody for 12 months. (The same age restrictions
as for a child apply.)
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to a variety of loans as Table 1 illustrates. The consequences of entering into usurious
loans can also vary widely with respect to criminal and civil penalties. For purposes
of ease of comparison, Table 1 contains a compilation of the maximum interest rate
allowable in the 50 states and in the District of Columbia. The table also notes the
civil penalties for creditors who make usurious loans. (The criminal penalties for
usury, where applicable, are not are not referenced in the table.

State

Table 1: Maximum Allowable Interest Rate by State
Maximum Allowable Annual In- Effect of Usurious
terest Rate
Contract

Alabama

6 percent on oral contracts and 8 percent on written contracts17
Loans or credit sales up to $2,000 may
not exceed a 6 percent.18 In the alternative, creditors may charge a maximum of 2 percent above the prime rate
for credit sales.19 Revolving credit arrangements may carry a maximum
monthly interest rate of 1.75 percent
for the first $750 and 1.5 percent for
any amount above $750.20

Entire interest is forfeit.21

Alaska

10.5 percent22
For loan amounts of up to $25,000 the
maximum interest that may be charged

Entire interest is forfeit.24

is the greater of 10 percent or 5 points
above the rate charged member banks
for advances by the 12th Federal Reserve District on the day on which the
contract or loan commitment is
made.23

17. ALA. CODE § 8-8-1 (1975). For loans made by savings and loan institutions in the state and secured
by a savings account, the maximum yearly rate of interest is limited to 2 percent above the interest paid by the
institution to the depositor on the secured account ALA. CODE § 8-8-1.2 (1975). Interest on loans of $2,000 or
more, however, are not subject to a usury defense ALA. CODE § 8-8-5 (1975). Numerous exceptions are provided
under Alabama law for charging higher rates of interest by, among others, certain public hospital corporations
ALA. CODE § 22-21-6 (1975), certain municipal bonds ALA. CODE § 11-20-5 (1975), Water Pollution Control
Authority securities ALA. CODE § 22-34-14 (1975), and notes, bonds or other securities issued by the State or
any instrumentality thereof ALA. CODE § 8-8-7 (1975).
18. ALA. CODE § 11-20-48(a)(1975).
19. ALA. CODE § 8-8-14(b)(1975) (prime rate is the average prime rate of the three largest banks in New
York City three days prior to the sale).
20. Id.
21. ALA. CODE § 8-8-12 (1975) Usury cannot be pleaded as a defense against a holder in due course of a
negotiable instrument. ALA. CODE § 8-8-12(b) (1975).
22. ALASKA STAT. § 45.45.010(a) (2015).
23. ALASKA STAT. § 45.45.010 (b) (2015).
24. ALASKA STAT. § 45.45.040 (2015).
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Arizona

10 percent for oral agreements25
No maximum rate on written agreements26

Entire interest is forfeit.27

Arkansas

17 percent28

Unspecified29

California

7 percent30
10 percent if agreed to in writing in
contracts involving personal, family or
household purposes31
The greater of 10 percent or 5 points
above the prime rate established by the
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco for other loans32.

Treble the amount of the
usurious interest paid is
recoverable.33

Colorado

45 percent (written agreement required)34

Connecticut

12 percent36

Delaware

5 points above the Federal Reserve
discount rate.38 No limit on leans in
excess of $100,000 that are not secured
by a mortgage.39

Contract void as to usurious interest (usurious
portion of interest not recoverable).35
Principal and entire interest forfeit.37
Usurious portion of interest is not recoverable.40

25. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN § 44-1201 (2011).
26. Id.
27. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN § 44-1202 (2011).
28. ARK. CONST. amend. 89, § 3. There is no maximum rate of interest that applies to loans made to or by
governmental units in the state or to bonds issued by governmental units absent rules to the contrary being
established by the General Assembly (ARK. CONST. amend. 89, § 1 (3)).
29. The forfeiting of interest is not specifically addressed in ARK. CONST. amend. 89. Article 19, Section
13 of the Arkansas Constitution provided that all loans that are usurious “shall be void as to the unpaid interest”
and that the borrower is entitled to “twice the amount of interest paid.” See Smith v. Eisen, 245 S.W. 3d 160,
167 (Ark. Ct. App. 2006). However, ARK. CONST. amend. 89, § 14 has repealed Article 19, Section 13.
30. CAL. CONST. Art. 15, § 1, Sec. 1 (West 2015).
31. CAL. CONST. Art. 15, § 1, Sec. 1(1) (West 2015).
32. CAL. CONST. Art. 15, § 1, Sec. 1(2) (West 2015).
33. CAL. UNCOD INIT MEASURES AND STATS 1919 -1§3(a) (Deering 1919).
34. COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-12-103 (1) (2012). (If interest is unspecified in a contract or if an oral agreement
is involved, the rate of interest would be 8 percent under C OLO. REV. STAT. § 5-12-101.)
35. COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-5-201 (2) (2012). (Any amount paid in excess of the maximum interest allowed
by law is recoverable by the debtor and punitive damages may be awarded under C OLO. REV. STAT. § 5-5-201
(3).)
36. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 37-4 (West 2015).
37. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 37-8 (West 2015).
38. DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 6 § 2301(a) (2015).
39. DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 6 § 2301(c) (2015).
40. DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 6 § 2304 (2015) (stating that the greater or treble damages or $500 are awardable
to the debtor if the entire usurious interest has been paid).
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Florida

18 for loans up to $500,000. No maximum rate for loans above $500,000.41

Entire interest forfeit.42

Georgia

7 percent absent a written contract43
16 percent in loans with a written contract for debt up to $3,00044

Entire interest is forfeit.45

Hawaii

10 percent absent a written agreement
with a different rate46
12 percent maximum rate for written
consumer credit contracts other than
credit cards47
24 percent for financial institutions
regulated by chapter 412 [Code of Financial Institutions] other than credit
unions and trust companies48

Entire interest is forfeit.49

Idaho

12 percent absent a written agreement
specifying a different rate50
No maximum rate in general for written contracts51

Unspecified.

Illinois

9 percent for written contracts52
No interest limit on retail charge
agreements53
18 percent for revolving credit agreements54

Indiana

25 percent56
The maximum rate for revolving loans
and other supervised loans57 can be either of the following two options:

Debtor may recover an
amount equal to twice
the entire interest, discount and charges due
on the loan or paid by
the debtor, whichever is
greater.55
Interest payable is the
maximum interest allowed by law. The usuri-

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

FLA. STAT. ANN. § 687.03(1) (West 2015).
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 687.04 (West 2015).
GA. CODE ANN. § 7-4-2(a)(1)(A) (2015).
GA. CODE ANN. § 7-4-2(a)(2) (2015).
GA. CODE ANN. § 7-4-10 (2015).
HAW. REV. STAT. § 478-2 (West 2015).
HAW. REV. STAT. § 478-4(a) (West 2015).
Id.
HAW. REV. STAT. § 478-5 (West 2015).
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 28-22-104 (West 2015).
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 28-42-201(1) (West 2015).
815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 205/4(1) (West 2015).
815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/28 (West 2015).
815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 205/4.2 (West 2015).
815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 205/6 (West 2015).
IND. CODE ANN. § 24-4.5-3-201 (West 2015).
IND. CODE ANN. § 24-4-5-3-501(1) (West 2015) (a supervised loan is a consumer loan with an interest
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Option 1:
36 percent on first $2,000 of unpaid
balance;58 and
21 percent on the unpaid balance that
is more than $2,000 and less than
$4,000;59 and
15 percent on the balance that is
greater than $4,00060
Option 2:
25 percent on the unpaid balance 61

ous portion of the interest is unenforceable and,
if paid, must be refunded
to the debtor.62

Iowa

5 percent contracts not expressed in a
writing or when interest is not stated63
No maximum interest rate as to written
contracts involving real estate, loans
for business and agricultural purposes,
and some loans for personal, family or
household purposes for real estate exceeding an indexed
threshold
64
amount.
21 percent for consumer credit sales
not involving open-end credit65
No limit for open-end consumer credit
sales66

Interest is forfeit and an
8 percent penalty on the
remaining unpaid principal is assessed to be paid
to the State.67

Kansas

10 percent in the absence of agreement
to a different rate68
15 percent generally69 (not applicable
to business or agricultural loans70)
No limit on open end consumer loans
not secured by a first or second mortgage71
36 percent on the portion of the unpaid
balance which is $860 or less, and 21

Interest above permitted
rate is forfeit (an additional amount equal to
the excess interest and
reasonable
attorney’s
fees may also be recovered in a counterclaim
by the debtor in any action by the creditor to

rate of 25% or more).
58. IND. CODE ANN. § 24-4.5-3-508(2)(a)(i) (West 2015).
59. IND. CODE ANN. § 24-4.5-3-508(2)(a)(ii) (West 2015).
60. IND. CODE ANN. § 24-4.5-3-508(2)(a)(iii) (West 2015).
61. IND. CODE ANN. § 24-4.5-3-508(2)(b) (West 2015).
62. IND. CODE ANN. § 24-4.5-5-202(3) (West 2015).
63. IOWA CODE ANN. § 535.2(1)(a)-(g) (West 2015).
64. IOWA CODE ANN. § 535.2(2) (West 2015). See also 12 C.F.R. § 1026.3 (2015).
65. IOWA CODE ANN. § 537.2202(1) (West 2015).
66. Id.
67. IOWA CODE ANN. § 537.2201(2) (West 2015).
68. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 16-201 (2015).
69. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 16-207(a) (2015).
70. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 16-207(e) (2015).
71. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 16a-2-401(1) (2015).
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percent on the portion of the unpaid
balance which exceeds $86072
18 percent for consumer loans secured
by a first or second mortgage73

enforce the
contract).74

Kentucky

8 percent absent a writing75
4 percent above the Federal Reserve
bank discount rate for written loans up
to $15,000 or 19 percent, whichever is
less76
No limit for loans above $15,00077

Entire interest is forfeit.
If usurious interest has
been paid, twice the
amount of the interest
paid may be recovered.78

Louisiana

12 percent pursuant to a written contract79
Does not apply to commercial or business loans80

Entire interest is forfeit.81

Maine

For consumer credit sales other than
open-end credit interest may not exceed the greater of:
18 percent,82 or
30 percent of unpaid balance up to
$1,000 and
21 percent on amounts greater than
$1,000 up to $2,800 and
15 percent on amounts above
$2,800.83
18 percent for open-end credit other
than credit cards.84
No interest limit on lender credit
cards85
No limit for non-consumer transactions86

Debtor need not pay the
portion of the interest
that is higher than that
allowed by law.87 If the
interest has been paid,
the usurious portion of
the interest may be reclaimed by the debtor.88

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

KAN. STAT. ANN. § 16a-2-401(2) (2015).
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 16a-2-401(3)-(4) (2015).
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 16-207(d) (2015).
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 360.010(1) (West 2015).
Id.
Id.
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 360.020(1) (West 2015).
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:3500(C)(1) (2015).
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:3500(D) (2015).
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:3501 (2015).
ME. REV. STAT. ANN., tit. 9 § 2-201(2)(B) (2015).
ME. REV. STAT. ANN., tit. 9 § 2-201(2)(A) (2015).
ME. REV. STAT. ANN., tit. 9 § 2-402(4) (2015).
ME. REV. STAT. ANN., tit. 9 § 2-402(5) (2015).
ME. REV. STAT. ANN., tit. 9 § 2-601 (2015).
ME. REV. STAT. ANN., tit. 9 § 5-201(3) (2015).
Id.

usurious
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Maryland

8 percent for loans evidenced by a
written, signed agreement.89
Loans secured by a borrower’s certificate of deposit may carry an interest 2
percent greater than the interest on the
CD.90
24 percent for loans secured by collateral other than a savings account and
for certain unsecured loans.91
No maximum rate on some loans secured by a first mortgage on residential
property.92

Forfeit the greater of
three times the amount
of interest and charges
above those authorized
by law or $500.93

Massachusetts

6 percent if there is no written agreement to the contrary.94
20 percent for loans evidenced by a
written agreement.95
21 percent for retail installment sales
agreements.96

All interest is forfeit in
consumer retail agreements.97 In other agreements, excess interest
paid above the lawful
rate is recoverable.98

Michigan

5 percent.99
7 percent if evidenced by a writing.100
(Not applicable to corporate borrowers.101)

All interest forfeit.102

Minnesota

6 percent unless a higher rate is agreed
to in writing.103
8 percent if evidenced by a writing. 104
No maximum rate for contracts of
$100,000 or more.105

Usurious contracts are
void.107 Excess interest
paid above permitted
rate is recoverable.108

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
107.
108.

MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 12-103(a)(1) (West 2015).
MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 12-103(a)(2) (West 2015).
MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 12-103(a)(3) (West 2015).
MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 12-103(b)(1) (West 2015).
MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 12-114(a)(1) (West 2015).
MASS. ANN. LAWS, ch. 107, § 3 (LexisNexis 2015).
MASS. ANN. LAWS, ch. 271, § 49 (LexisNexis 2015).
MASS. ANN. LAWS, ch. 255D, § 11(B) (LexisNexis 2015).
MASS. ANN. LAWS, ch. 255D, § 29(A) (LExisNexis 2015).
MASS. ANN. LAWS, ch. 140, § 106 (LexisNexis 2015).
MICH. COM. LAWS SERV. § 438.31 (LexisNexis 2015).
Id.
MICH. COM. LAWS SERV. § 450.1275 (LexisNexis 2015).
MICH. COM. LAWS SERV. § 438.32 (LexisNexis 2015).
MINN. STAT. § 334.01 (subdiv. 2) (LexisNexis 2015).
Id.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 334.01 (subdiv. 3) (West 2015).
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 334.03 (West 2015).
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 334.02 (West 2015).
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4.5 percent above the discount rate on
90-day commercial paper Federal reserve rate for the District encompassing Minnesota when business or agricultural loans are involved.106.
Mississippi

8 percent109
For written agreements, the greater of
10 percent or 5 percent above discount
rate on 90-day commercial paper of
the Federal Reserve bank in the Federal Reserve district where the lender
is located.110
For partnerships, religious organizations and for-profit and not-for-profit
entities, the greater of 15 percent or 5
percent above discount rate on 90-day
commercial paper of the Federal Reserve bank in the Federal Reserve district where the lender is located for
loans in excess of $2,500.111

Forfeiture provision for
entire interest only
available if lender executes evidence of debt in
a note or contract purporting to have a rate of
interest not greater than
6 percent but actually
charges a greater rate of
interest (whether usurious or legal).112 Specific
remedies are not provided by statute.

Missouri

10 percent (written agreement required) or 3 points above the index of
long-term U.S. Government Bonds,
whichever is higher.113 Banks, trust
companies and savings and loans associations can purchase any note, bill of
exchange, or other evidence of debt at
any price agreed upon.114

Twice the amount of interest paid above the legal rate is recoverable by
the debtor along with
court costs and reasonable attorney’s fees.115

Montana

15 percent or an amount that is 6 percentage points per year above the
prime rate published by the Federal
Reserve system in its statistical release
H.15 Selected Interest Rates for bank
prime loans dated 3 business days
prior to the execution of the agreement.116

Forfeiture of a sum double the amount of interest that the note, bill, or
other evidence of debt
carries or that has been
agreed to be paid on the
note, bill, or other evidence of debt.117

106. MINN. STAT. ANN, § 334.011 (subdiv. 1) (West 2015). Section 334.011, subdivision 2 of the Minnesota Code requires all interest to be forfeit for such loans and allows twice the amount of the usurious interest
paid. MINN. STAT. § 334.01 (subdiv. 2)(West 2015).
109. MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-17-1(1) (LexisNexis 2015).
110. MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-17-1(2) (LexisNexis 2015).
111. MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-17-1(3) (LexisNexis 2015).
112. MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-17-3 ( LexisNexis 2015).
113. MO. ANN. STAT. § 408.030(1) (West 2015).
114. MO. ANN. STAT. § 408.030(4) (West 2015).
115. MO. ANN. STAT. § 408.030(2) (West 2015).
116. MONT. CODE ANN. § 31-1-107(1) (2015).
117. MONT. CODE ANN. § 31-1-108(1) (2015).
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Nebraska

16 percent.118

All interest is forfeit.119

Nevada

No maximum rate.120

Not applicable.

New
Hampshire

10 percent unless otherwise agreed to
in writing.121

Unspecified.

New Jersey

6 percent absent a written contract.122
16 percent if expressed in a written
contract.123

Unspecified

New Mexico

15 percent absent a written contract.124
15 percent on current or open accounts
but parties may set a higher rate by
agreement.125
No limit to loans to corporations. 126
No limit to business or commercial
loans in excess of $500,000.127

Forfeiture of interest in
excess of that allowed
by law.128

New York

16 percent.129
No limit on loans of $250,000 or more
other than one or two family home
mortgages.130
No limit on any loan of $2,500,000 or
more.131
Usury defense not available to corporations, associations and joint stock
companies.132

Usurious contracts are
void.133

North
Carolina

For loans of up to $15,000 payable in
not less than 12 months nor more than
96 months and not secured by a mortgages on real property or deeds of

Forfeiture of entire interest.139 If usurious interest has been paid by
the debtor, an action

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
139.

NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-101.03(1) (West 2015).
NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-105 (West 2015).
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 99.050 (West 2015).
N.H. REV. STAT. § 336:1(I) (2015).
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 31:1-1(a) (West 2015).
Id.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 56-8-3 (2015).
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 56-8-5 (2015).
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 56-8-9(B) (2015).
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 56-8-9(C) (2015).
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 56-8-13 (2015).
N.Y. BANKING LAW § 14-a(1) (McKinney 2015).
N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-501(6)(a) (McKinney 2015).
N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-501(6)(b) (McKinney 2015).
N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-511(1) (McKinney 2015).
N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-521(1) (McKinney 2015).
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 24-2 (West 2015).
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trust, the maximum interest is as follows:
30 percent on the first $4,000, 24 percent on amounts more than $4,000 up
to $8,000, and
18 percent on amounts in excess of
$8,000 up to $10,000. 134
18 percent on loans for amounts
greater than $10,000 and not more than
$15,000.135
18 percent for revolving credit loans.

45

may be brought to recover twice the amount
of the interest paid.140

136

No limit on fixed rate loans in excess
of $25,000.137
For loans other than open-ended loans
of up to $25,000 the maximum interest
is as follows:
The greater of 16 percent or 6 points
above U.S. Treasury Bills with a six
month maturity.138
North Dakota

5.5 percent above the average of U.S.
Treasury Bills maturing in six
months.141
Limit does not apply to corporations,
limited liability companies, cooperative corporations or associations or
trusts.142 The limit also does not apply
to partnerships, limited partnerships,
or associations that file a state or federal partnership income tax return. 143

Forfeiture of the entire
interest and 25 percent
of the principal.144 If
usurious interest has
been paid, twice the
amount of interest paid
is recoverable by the
debtor along with 25
percent of the principal.145

Ohio

8 percent146
For retail sales contracts, the greater of
8 percent for balances of $750 or less
plus a finance charge of $0.50 for the
first $50 and $0.25 for each additional

Forfeiture of interest
above that allowed by
law.153.

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
153.

N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-176(a)(1) (West 2015).
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-176(a)(2) (West 2015).
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 24-11(a) (West 2015).
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 24-1.1(a)(2) (West 2015).
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 24-1.1(c) (West 2015).
Id.
N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 47-14-09(1) (West 2015).
N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 47-14-09(2)(b) (West 2015).
N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 47-14-09(2)(c) (West 2015).
N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 47-14-10 (West 2015).
N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 47-14-10(1) (West 2015).
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1343.01(A) (LexisNexis 2015).
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1317.061 (LexisNexis 2015).
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$50 of debt, or 1.5 percent per
month.147
No limit on loans in excess of
$100,000.148
No limit for contracts with registered
brokers or dealers for debt payable on
demand and secured by stocks, bonds
or other securities.149
Revolving charge retail sales agreements may carry an alternate rate of up
to 25 percent.150
No limit on loans evidenced by a demand instrument that is not secured by
household furnishings or goods used
for household, personal or family
use.151
No limit for most business loans152
Oklahoma

10 percent in the absence of legislation
providing for a different rate154
10 percent for consumer loans.155
45 percent for other than consumer
loans156.

Forfeiture of entire interest; If any usurious interest has been paid,
twice the interest paid is
recoverable.157

Oregon

9 percent in the absence of an agreement for a different rate.158
For loans up to $50,000, the higher or
12 percent or 5 percent above the average discount rate for 90-day commercial paper set by the Federal Reserve
bank in the district in which the loan is
made.159

All interest is forfeit.160

147. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1317.06(A)(1)-(2) (LexisNexis 2015).
148. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1343.01(B)(1) (LexisNexis 2015).
149. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1343.01(B)(2) (LexisNexis 2015).
150. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1317.061 (LexisNexis 2015).
151. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1343.01(B)(5) (LexisNexis 2015).
152. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1343.01(B)(6) (LexisNexis 2015).
154. OKLA. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
155. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 14A, § 3-201(1) (West 2015).
156. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 14A, § 3-605 (West 2015) (referencing § 5-107 (2) as the highest rate allowed
for non-consumer loans [45 percent as of this writing]).
157. OKLA. CONST. art. IV, § 3.
158. OR. REV. STAT. § 82.010(1) (West 2015).
159. OR. REV. STAT. § 82.010(3) (West 2015).
160. OR. REV. STAT. § 82.010(4) (West 2015). (But note: certain financial institutions, mortgage lenders,
and interest charged by broker-dealers are exempt from the usury provisions in O.R.S. § 82.010 (3)-(4) under
O.R.S. § 82.025 (1)-(8).)
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6 percent for loans up to $50,000.161
No limit on loans in excess of
$50,000.162
No limit on unsecured loans greater
than $35,000.163
No limit on business loans regardless
of amount.164
2.5 percent above the Monthly Index
of Long Term United States Government Bond Yields for residential mortgage loans.165
The higher of:
21 percent or 9 percent plus the domestic prime rate as published in the
Money Rates section of The Wall
Street Journal.169
No limit on credit card loans.170
No limit on loans to commercial entities in excess of $1,000,000 not secured by a mortgage against the residence of any principal borrower.171

6 percent absent a written contract.177
No limit for written contracts generally.178

47

Forfeiture of interest
above that allowed by
law.166 If excess interest
has been paid, three
times the excess interest
paid is recoverable.167
Costs and reasonable attorney’s fees are also recoverable by a prevailing debtor.168
Usurious contracts are
void,172 except as to
holders in due course of
negotiable
instru173
ments.
Payments of
interest and/or principal
are recoverable by the
debtor.174 If the lenders
are financial institutions
and if a usurious contract is knowingly made,
then all interest is forfeit.175 In such cases,
twice the amount of any
interest paid by the
debtor is recoverable.176
Excess charges beyond
those allowed by law are
recoverable.187 If excess
charges are not refunded

161. 41 PA. CONS. STAT. § 201(a) (2015).
162. 41 PA. CONS. STAT. § 201(b) (2015).
163. 41 PA. CONS. STAT. § 201(b)(2) (2015).
164. 41 PA. CONS. STAT. § 201(b)(3) (2015).
165. 41 PA. CONS. STAT. § 301(b) (2015).
166. 41 PA. CONS. STAT. §501 (2015).
167. 41 PA. CONS. STAT. § 502 (2015).
168. 41 PA. CONS. STAT. § 503 (2015).
169. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-26-2(a)-(b) (1956).
170. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-26-2(d) (1956). See also R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-26.1-4 (1956) (allowing credit card
lenders to set interest “at any daily, weekly, monthly, annual or other periodic percentage rate”).
171. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-26-2(e) (1956).
172. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-26-4(a) (1956).
173. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-26-4(b) (1956).
174. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-26-4(c) (1956).
175. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-26-4(d) (1956).
176. Id.
177. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-10-106(1) (1976).
178. Id.
187. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-5-202(3) (1979).
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Exception for consumer contracts:
12 percent for consumer loans with
lenders who are not supervised lenders.179
For consumer loans with supervised
lenders rates are as follows for loans
up to $7,500:
Loans up to $150, $2.50 charge per
month in lieu of interest;180
Loans greater than $150 up to $2,000,
$25 per $100 borrowed for the first
$600, $18 per $100 borrowed on
amounts exceeding $600 up to $1,000,
and $12 per $100 for amounts exceeding $1,000 up to $2,000.181 This sliding scale is based on a 12 month loan
with allowable interest for loans of
lesser or greater duration adjusted accordingly to effect the yearly maximum interest charges.182 An additional amount not to exceed the lesser
of $56 or 7 percent of the amount borrowed may also be charged.183
Loans in excess of $2,000 up to $7,500
are limited to 9 percent annual interest
on the entire loan.184 An additional
charge of the lesser of 5 percent of the
amount borrowed or $200 may also be
assessed on such loans.185 Splitting of
loans greater than $2,000 into multiple
loans for the purpose of obtaining a
higher interest rate is prohibited.186

on request when a consumer loan is involved, a
court may impose a penalty of not less than $100
nor more than $1,000 on
the lender.188

South Dakota

No maximum rate for written agreements.189

Not applicable.

Tennessee

10 percent absent legislation to the
contrary.190
For bank installment loans:

Usurious interest above
the permitted rate may
be offset as a defense

179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
188.
189.
190.

S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-3-201(1) (1976).
S.C. CODE ANN. § 34-29-140(a)(1) (1976).
S.C. CODE ANN. § 34-29-140(a)(2) (1976).
Id.
Id.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 34-29-140(a)(3) (1976).
Id.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 34-29-140(d) (1979).
Id.
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 54-3-1.1 (2015).
TENN. CONST. art. 11, § 7.
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10.53 percent on loans of less than 6
months.191
11.58 percent on loans greater than six
months but less than one year.192
12.59 percent for loans of at least 12
months but less than 24 months.193
13.38 percent for loans of at least 24
months but less than 36 months.194
14.17 percent for loans of at least 36
months but less than 48 months.195
15.04 percent for loans of at least 48
months but less than 60 months.196
16.02 percent for loans of at least 60
months but less than 72 months.197
17.15 percent for loans at least 72
months but less than 84 months.198
18 percent for loans 84 months or
longer.199

against creditor in an action to collect on the
debt.200

10 percent in the absence of a statute
to the contrary.201
Consumer loans that are not secured
by real property may carry maximum
interest rates as follows:
30 percent up to $500.202
24 percent on amounts greater than
$500 up to $1,050.203
18 percent on amounts greater than
$1,050 up to $2,500.204

Creditors are liable to
obligors for three times
the difference between
the usurious contract
rate and the maximum
interest allowed by law
or, in the alternative, the
lesser of 20 percent of
the principal amount or
$2,000.205

191. TENN. CODE ANN. § 45-2-1106(1)(A)(i) (2015).
192. TENN. CODE ANN. § 45-2-1106(1)(A)(ii) (2015).
193. TENN. CODE ANN. § 45-2-1106(1)(A)(iii) (2015).
194. TENN. CODE ANN. § 45-2-1106(1)(A)(iv) (2015).
195. TENN. CODE ANN. § 45-2-1106(1)(A)(v) (2015).
196. TENN. CODE ANN. § 45-2-1106(1)(A)(vi) (2015).
197. TENN. CODE ANN. § 45-2-1106(1)(A)(vii) (2015).
198. TENN. CODE ANN. § 45-2-1106(1)(A)(viii) (2015).
199. TENN. CODE ANN. § 45-2-1106(1)(A)(ix) (2015).
200. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-14-110. See also TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-14-115(a) (2015) (giving Chancery
Court concurrent jurisdiction with courts of law for the abatement and recovery of usurious charges beyond
those allowed by law).
201. TEX. CONST. ART. 16, § 11.
202. TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 342.201(e)(1) (West 2015). Note that dollar amounts are indexed per
V.T.C.A., Finance Code § 341 Subchapter C yearly based on the Consumer Price Index.
203. TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 342.201(e)(2) (West 2015).
204. TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 342.201(e)(3) (West 2015).
205. TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 305.001(a)(1)-(2) (West 2015).
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Utah

Parties may agree to any rate. 206 If no
rate is agreed to, then the interest defaults to 10 percent.207

Unspecified.

Vermont

12 percent generally208
18 percent for single payment loans by
lenders regulated by Title 8 and federal
savings and loan associations.209
18 percent for the first $500.00 and 15
percent for the balance in excess of
$500.00 for retail installment contracts.210
No limit for bank credit cards.211
18 percent for loans secured by new
vehicles and 20 percent for loans secured by vehicles older than the current or previous model year.212
24 percent on the first $1000.00 and 12
percent on the balance in excess of
$1000.00; or 18 percent annual percentage rate on the aggregate balance
outstanding whichever is higher for installment loans other than those noted
above.213.
18 percent for loans secured by subordinate liens on real estate.214
21 percent for retail charge agreements215

Creditors who knowingly enter into usurious
contracts forfeit all interest and half of the
principal
loan
216
amount.
If usurious
interest is paid by a
debtor, however, only
the amount of the interest above the permissible rate is recoverable
along with interest
thereon and reasonable
attorney’s fees.217

Virginia

12 percent generally.218
No limit on bank installment loans.219
Consumer finance companies may
charge the following rates on consumer loans:

Interest in excess of that
permitted by law is recoverable and, when
such charges are willful,
twice the amount of such
interest paid is recoverable along with the excess

206. UTAH CODE ANN. § 15-1-1 (LexisNexis 1953).
207. Id.
208. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. IX, § 41a(a) (2015).
209. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. IX, § 41a(b)(1) (2015).
210. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. IX, § 41a(b)(2) (2015).
211. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. IX, § 41a(b)(3) (2015).
212. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. IX, § 41a(b)(4) (2015) (applicable to “motor vehicles, mobile homes, travel trailers, aircraft, watercraft and farm equipment”).
213. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. IX, § 41a(b)(5) (2015).
214. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. IX, § 41a(b)(7) (2015).
215. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. IX, § 41a(b)(9) (2015).
216. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. IX, § 50(b) (2015).
217. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. IX, § 50(a) (2015).
218. VA. CODE ANN. § 6.2-303(A) (2015).
219. VA. CODE ANN. § 6.2-309 (2015).
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36 percent for loans up to $2,500;220
and
Any rate agreed to for loans in excess
of $2,500.221
36 percent for payday loans [in addition with a fee of up to 20 percent] 222
Motor vehicle title loans:
22 percent per month for the first
$700;223
18 percent per month for amounts
above $700 up to $1,400;224
15 percent per month for amounts
above $1,400.225
No limit on loans to entities.226
12 percent or four percentage points
above the Federal Reserve System
published rate for twenty-six week
treasury bills, whichever is higher. 229
No limit for loans to profit and nonprofit corporations, Massachusetts
trusts, associations, trusts, general
partnerships, joint ventures, limited
partnerships, and governments and
governmental subdivisions, agencies,
or instrumentalities.230
No limit for loans primarily for agricultural, commercial, investment, or
business purposes.231

interest paid, court costs
and reasonable attorney’s fees.227 If usurious
interest has not been
paid, a borrower may
plead usury as a defense
to an action on the contract and if proven, judgment will be entered
only for the principal
sum, will all interest forfeit by the lender.228.

24 percent on written contracts generally.234
No limit on the interest that can be
charged on loans in excess of $2,500

Interest above the legal
rate paid is recoverable
within one year of payment by the debtor.241

All interest is forfeit and
creditors may only recover the principal
amount minus the rate of
interest
contracted
232
for.
If interest has
been paid, the creditor is
entitled to a return only
of the principal amount
of the loan minus twice
the rate of interest contracted for.233

220. VA. CODE ANN. § 6.2-1520(A)(1) (2015).
221. VA. CODE ANN. § 6.2-1520(A)(2) (2015).
222. VA. CODE ANN. § 6.2-1817(A) (2015). An additional loan fee of 20 percent of the amount advanced
can be also be imposed as well as a $5 loan verification fee under § 6.2-1817(B)-(C) of the Virginia Code. VA.
CODE ANN. § 6.2-1817(B)-(C) (2015).
223. VA. CODE ANN. § 6.2-2216(A)(1) (2015).
224. VA. CODE ANN. § 6.2-2216(A)(2) (2015).
225. VA. CODE ANN.. § 6.2-2216(A)(3) (2015).
226. VA. CODE ANN. § 6.2-308 (2015).
227. VA. CODE ANN. § 6.2-305 (2015).
228. VA. CODE ANN.. § 6.2-304 (2015).
229. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.52.020(1) (West 2015).
230. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.52.080 (West 2015).
231. Id.
232. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.52.030(1) (West 2015).
233. Id.
234. D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3301(a) (2015).
241. D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3304 (2015).
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that are not secured by a mortgage on
real property or a cooperative apartment lease that are the primary residence of the borrower if any of the following conditions are satisfied:235
· The borrower is a not for profit corporation;236
· The borrower is an individual, group
of individuals, corporation, unincorporated association, partnership, or
other entity, and the loan is made for
the purpose of acquiring or carrying
on a business, professional, or commercial activity;237 the borrower is
an individual, a group of individuals,
corporation, unincorporated association, partnership, or any other entity,
and the loan is made for the purpose
of acquiring any real or personal
property as an investment or for carrying on an investment activity;238
· The borrower is a religious society,
formed under, or subject to, Chapter
4 of Title 29, and the loan is made for
the purpose of acquiring or making
an improvement on any real or personal property for purposes other
than commercial or investment activities.239
The Council of the District of Columbia is authorized to provide by exemptions to the maximum rates of interest allowable and to change the
maximum allowable rates of interest
by regulations.240
West Virginia

235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
242.
243.
245.

Generally 6 percent on oral contracts242 and
8 percent on written contracts.243

D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3301(d)(1) (2015).
D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3301(d)(1)(A) (2015).
D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3301(d)(1)(B) (2015).
D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3301(d)(1)(C) (2015).
D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3301(d)(1)(D) (2015).
D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3309 (2015).
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 47-6-5(a) (West 2015).
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 47-6-5(b) (West 2015).
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 47-6-6 (West 2015).

All interest is forfeit.245
In addition, the borrower
may recover from the
original lender or any
holder other than a
holder in due course the
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9 percent on written contracts involving residential real estate secured by a
first mortgage.244

greater of $100 or four
times the amount of interest agreed to be paid
on any usurious contract.246

Wisconsin

12 percent.247
No limits on loans to corporations or
limited liability companies.248
No limit for loans in excess of
$150,000 that are not secured by a
mortgage on a one to four family
dwelling that is the borrower’s principal home.249

Wyoming

For consumer credit sales other than
revolving credit in the amount of
$75,000 or less:
36 percent on the first $1,000 and 21
percent on amounts above $1,000.252
No limit for loans in excess of
$75,000.253
For consumer revolving credit sales:
1.75 percent per month.254
10 percent for consumer loans other
than supervised loans.255
No limit for non-consumer loans.256

Principal amount in excess of $2,000 is recoverable but all interest is
generally forfeit.250 If
usurious interest has
been paid, all interest
paid may be recovered
and up to $2,000 of the
principal amount.251
Excess interest above
that allowed by law is
forfeit.257

Even a cursory perusal of Table 1 makes it abundantly clear that there is little
consistency in the regulation of interest rates or the civil consequences of usury at the
state level. States protect classes of borrowers from interest rates deemed unreasonably high as they see fit, with some providing strong protection for borrowers with
low interest rate caps and significant civil penalties, while others protect lenders (and
the right of individuals to contract freely) through eschewing the regulation of usury
altogether, by setting high rate caps, by exempting certain classes of borrowers from
rate caps, and by failing to impose any significant civil penalty as a disincentive to
244.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.

W. VA. CODE ANN. § 47-6-5(c) (West 2015).
Id.
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 138.05(1)(a) (West 2015).
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 138.05(5) (West 2015).
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 138.05(7) (West 2015).
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 138.06(1) (West 2015).
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 138.06(3) (West 2015).
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 40-14-212(b)(i)(A)-(B) (1977).
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 40-14-212(b)(ii) (1977).
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 40-14-218(c)(i) (1977).
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 40-14-310(a) (1977).
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 40-14-260 (1977).
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 40-14-521(c) (1977).
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violate rate caps when these exist. Thus Nevada and Utah impose no maximum cap
on interest rates, with Idaho, New Hampshire and South Dakota permitting any rate
of interest to be charged as long as there is a written contract. A number of states,
including Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, New Mexico, New York, North
Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin and Wyoming, exempt either business entities and/or business loans from interest rate caps applicable
to other borrowers in these states. In some states, interest caps are inapplicable if a
loan amount exceeds a specific dollar amount, such as $100,000 (and not secured by
a mortgage) in Delaware, $500,000 in Florida, $15,000 in Kentucky, $100,000 in
Minnesota, $250,000 in New York (other than loans secured by a mortgage for one
and two family homes, and any loan with a value of more than $2,500,000), $25,000
(for fixed-rate loans) in North Carolina, $100,000 in Ohio, $35,000 in Pennsylvania
for unsecured loans ($50,000 for any loan), $1,000,000 in Rhode Island for commercial loans (except those secured by a home mortgage), $150,000 in Wisconsin (for
loans not secured by a mortgage on a 1-4 family dwelling), and $75,000 in Wyoming.
Some states have relatively low caps, such as Alabama (generally 6-8 percent), California (7-10 percent), and West Virginia (6-9 percent), while others have relatively
high caps, such as Colorado’s 45 percent.
The civil consequences of entering into a usurious contract also vary widely from
state to state as illustrated in Table 1. Among the states, Connecticut provides the
harshest civil penalty making the creditor forfeit all interest as well as the principal
amount of the loan. Twenty-three states and Washington D.C. provide for a forfeiture
of the entire interest in an usurious contract: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California
(treble the amount of interest actually paid is recoverable), Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois (twice the entire interest is recoverable), Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts (but only in consumer retail agreements), Michigan, Montana
(forfeiture of double the amount of interest), Nebraska, North Carolina, North Dakota
(25 percent of principal is also forfeit), Oklahoma, Oregon, Vermont (half of the
principal is also forfeit), Washington, Washington D.C., and Wisconsin. Sixteen
states allow for the forfeiture of the excess interest above the legal rate: Colorado,
Delaware, Indiana, Kansas, Maine, Maryland (the lesser of three times the amount
above the maximum rate of interest or $500 is recoverable), Minnesota, Missouri
(twice the amount of interest paid above the legal rate is recoverable), New Mexico,
Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee (permits excess interest above legal
rate actually paid to be offset as a defense in an action to collect on the debt), Texas
(allows for the recovery of three times the amount of interest above the legal rate or,
in the alternative, the lesser of 20 percent of the principal or $2,000), Virginia (also
allows for the recovery or twice the amount of interest above the permissible rate,
court costs and reasonable attorney’s fees for willful usury), and Wyoming. The remaining states either treat usurious contracts as void or do not make specific provisions as to a remedy in their statutory framework. If a state’s statutory framework
declares usurious contracts void, then generally no recovery may be sought in court
by the creditor.258

258. See, e.g., 44B AM. JUR. 2d Interest and Usury § 217 (2015).
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III. FEDERAL RESTRICTIONS ON USURY
The federal government has never imposed a general restriction on usury in the
United States, leaving it up to the states to regulate the matter as they see fit. With
the exception of loans to active duty military personnel and their dependents for
whom a maximum interest rate of 36 percent is imposed by federal law,259 Congress
has been more concerned with mandating transparency as to the cost of credit transactions than with regulating interest rates or fees as such. The Truth in Lending Act
(TILA),260 for example, requires lenders to provide to consumers detailed information about the cost of credit that includes not only interest, points, and related
charges261 but also service or carrying charges,262 any loan fee or finder’s fee,263 fees
for investigation or credit reports,264 credit insurance fees,265 broker fees charged to
the borrower,266 and insurance premiums included in the finance charge.267 Thus the
emphasis is on providing credit to consumers with full disclosure rather than on protecting consumers from unfair or even unreasonable credit terms (with the noted exception of active duty personnel and their covered dependents.) Nevertheless, federal
law does indirectly impact state usury laws in ways that undermine or negate state
efforts to protect their citizens against usurious contracts.
A. Nationally Chartered Banks are not Bound by State Usury Laws
The National Bank Act allows nationally chartered banks to charge “interest at
the rate allowed by the laws of the State, Territory, or District where the bank is
located, or at a rate of 1 per centum in excess of the discount rate on ninety-day
commercial paper in effect at the Federal reserve bank in the Federal reserve district
where the bank is located, whichever may be the greater.”268 Thus a nationally chartered bank located in Nevada, for example, where there is no maximum interest rate
under state law may charge any interest not only in Nevada but also in loans made in
any other state, regardless of the local state usury laws. Banks and other financial
institutions chartered under state law are restricted by the usury laws of every state
in which they do business, but not federally chartered banks as the U.S. Supreme
Court made clear in Marquette Nat’l Bank v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp.269 In Marquette, a Minnesota-chartered national banking association brought suit to enjoin the
operation of a federally chartered Nebraska bank’s credit card program in Minnesota
until such time as it complied with Minnesota usury laws. The trial court permanently
enjoined the Nebraska bank’s subsidiary from issuing credit cards in Minnesota. The

259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.

See Section I, supra and notes 13-15.
15 U.S.C. § 1605 (2015).
15 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) (2015).
15 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (2015).
15 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (2015).
15 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(4) (2015).
15 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5) (2015).
15 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(6) (2015).
15 U.S.C. § 1605(b)-(c) (2015).
12 U.S.C. § 85 (2015).
439 U.S. 299 (1978).
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Minnesota Supreme Court reversed, ruling that the National Bank Act permitted the
Nebraska bank to charge its Minnesota credit card customers any interest rate sanctioned by Nebraska law. On certiorari, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed. “Section 85
thus plainly provides that a national bank may charge interest ‘on any loan’ at the
rate allowed by the laws of the State in which the bank is “located,”270 wrote Justice
Brennan, and then concluded that a nationally chartered bank is “‘located’ for purposes of the section in the State named in its organization certificate.”271 Under current law, a bank can sidestep the usury laws of every state simply by obtaining a
federal charter in a state that has no caps on interest charges.

B. Special Protection for Military Personnel
As previously noted, federal law (commonly referred to as the Military Lending
Act) protects active duty military personnel and their dependents from predatory
loans by capping the maximum interest rate for these loans at 36 percent.272 In addition, as of October 13, 2010, loans incurred by military service members individually
or jointly with their spouses prior to entering military service are capped at six percent.273 Interest above six percent is forgiven274 for the period of the debtor’s military
service and for a year thereafter.275 Creditors can ask a court for protection from the
interest reduction if they can convince a judge that the debtor’s ability to repay a loan
at the original interest rate is not affected by the debtor’s military service.276 Military
reservists called to active duty are also provided relief from certain agricultural loans
by having interest forgiven and principal payments deferred during the period of active duty.277 Thus Congress has provided significant protection for active duty military personnel against predatory loans and has decreed that lenders provide temporary interest-free or low-interest loans under certain circumstances for active duty
military personnel. No such protection is offered, however, to the general public. To
the contrary, since nationally chartered banks can sidestep all state usury statutes by
organizing in a state that places no restriction on interest rates, at least as regards
federally chartered lenders, the federal government in effect preempts and nullifies
states’ efforts to restrict unreasonably high interest rates or predatory lending practices that they deem violate the stated public policy of the state to the detriment of
their citizens.
C. Tribal Immunity from State Usury Statutes
Indian tribes in the United States enjoy sovereign immunity that is subject to
Congressional limitation. Justice Kagan writing for the majority of a split United
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.

Marquette Nat’l Bank v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299, 308 (1978).
Id. at 310.
See Section I, supra and notes 13-16.
50 U.S.C.A. App. § 527(a)(1) (West 2015).
50 U.S.C.A. App. § 527(a)(2) (West 2015).
Id.
50 U.S.C.A. App. § 527(c) (West 2015).
7 U.S.C.A. § 1982 (West 2015).
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States Supreme Court recently noted:
As “‘domestic dependent nations,’” Indian tribes exercise “inherent sovereign authority” that is subject to plenary control by Congress. Unless and
“until Congress acts, the tribes retain” their historic sovereign authority.
Among the core aspects of sovereignty that tribes possess—subject to congressional action—is the “common-law immunity from suit traditionally
enjoyed by sovereign powers.” That immunity applies whether a suit is
brought by a State, or arises from a tribe’s commercial activities off Indian
lands.278
In recent years, lenders aligned with Indian tribes across the country have successfully used tribal immunity in many states to defeat usury laws.279 Despite criticism from consumer advocates and industry groups, as well as the mostly unsuccessful efforts of state attorneys general to enforce regulations, tribal-affiliated lenders
operate with relative impunity.280 Tribal sovereign immunity bars all suits against
Indian tribes except for the limited circumstances where the tribe itself waives immunity or Congress clearly and expressly abrogates such immunity.281 The U. S. Supreme Court in Kiowa Tribe v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc.282 made it
clear that both the governmental and commercial activities of a tribe and on and
off-reservation activities can be covered by tribal immunity.283 To date, state actions,
class action cases, and federal agency actions have yielded mixed results. Most agree
that federally recognized sovereign tribes have the authority to engage in internet
lending to state residents without those tribes being subjected to state authority. However, the extent to which tribal sovereign immunity shields service providers that
assist tribes engaging in credit transactions outside of tribal land is by no means settled.284 Whether non-tribal lenders who become affiliated with a tribe in what is often
referred to as a “rent a tribe” arrangement in order to cloak themselves with tribal
sovereign immunity and offer high-interest, high-fee loans outside of tribal lands
through the Internet, through brick and mortar payday loan storefronts and through
similar arrangements. 285 Typically these lenders reorganize an existing company under a tribal name, pay the tribe a fee, and operate their business from call centers or
locations outside of tribal lands.286 Tribal immunity for loans made outside of tribal
278. Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S.Ct. 2024, 2027 (2014).
279. Adam Mayle, Note, Usury on the Reservation: Regulation of Tribal-Affiliated Payday Lenders, 31
REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 1053 (2012).
280. Id. at 1058.
281. Meredith L. Jewitt, A Tradition of Sovereignty: Examining Tribal Sovereign Immunity in Bay Mills
Indian Community V. Michigan, 9 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y SIDEBAR 163, 167 (2014).
282. 523 U.S. 751 (1998).
283. Id. at 760.
284. See, e.g., Richard P. Eckman, et. al., Update on Tribal Loans To State Residents, 68 BUS. LAW. 677
(2013).
285. See generally Heather L. Petrovich, Circumventing State Consumer Protection Laws: Tribal Immunity
and Internet Payday Lending, 91 N.C. L. REV. 326 (2012); Jennifer H. Weddle, Nothing Nefarious: The Federal
Legal and Historical Predicate for Tribal Sovereign Lending, 61 APR FED. LAW. 58 (2014); Creola Johnson,
America’s First Consumer Financial Watchdog is on a Leash: Can The CFPB Use Its Authority to Declare
Payday-Loan Practices Unfair, Abusive, And Deceptive? 61 CATH. U. L. REV. 381 (2012).
286. Id. See Petrovich, supra note 285, at 342.
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lands, however, is not always applied as a matter of course. In Otoe–Missouria Tribe
of Indians v. New York State Department of Financial Services,287 federally recognized Indian tribes in Oklahoma and Michigan brought action for a preliminary injunction preventing New York from banning the high-interest, short-term consumer
loans they offered over the Internet, some of which exceeded a 1,000 percent annual
interest rate288. The District Court for the Southern District of New York denied
plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction289, and plaintiff appealed. The Court
of Appeals held that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in determining that
plaintiffs failed to demonstrate the likelihood of success on the merits because the
Court’s conclusions that the loans did not occur on Native American soil was reasonable. Whether the U.S. Supreme Court would reach the same conclusion is unclear.
But for the moment, at least, New York’s right to protect its citizens from internetbased loans from Native American tribes that solicit New Yorkers outside of their
sovereign tribal territory is upheld.
On the whole, however, efforts of state attorneys general to enforce regulations
have been largely unsuccessful and tribal-affiliated payday lenders operate with relative impunity with the practice of lenders affiliating with tribes becoming more common.290 In California and Colorado, courts have determined that lenders who are an
arm of the tribe are not subject to state’s usury laws.291 As of this writing, the Supreme Court of California has agreed to hear an appeal from the California Court of
Appeals decision dismissing five claims against tribal lenders on grounds of tribal
immunity in People v. Miami Nation Enterprises.292 Overall, it is abundantly clear
that state regulators face extreme difficulty in actions to enforce usury laws against
tribal lenders when such companies move to dismiss such actions for lack of jurisdiction based on tribal immunity.293
IV. FEDERAL LAW UNDERMINES STATE USURY STATUTES
The preemption of state usury statutes under federal law for federally chartered
lenders and lenders affiliated with Native American tribes294 have provided lenders
with useful tools for avoiding usury restrictions at the state level. To date, Congress
has only seen fit to protect military personnel and their families through the Military
Lending Act against predatory lenders.295 For the rest of Americans, only states currently offer protection against unreasonably high interest rates and credit fees. As
previously discussed296 and as is clearly evidenced in Table 1, most states have taken

287. 769 F.3d 105 (2d Cir. (2014).
288. 974 F.Supp.2d 353, 355 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
289. Id. at 355.
290. Mayle, supra note 279, at 1058.
291. Id. at 1062-64 (referencing, inter alia, State ex rel. Suthers v. Cash Advance & Preferred Cash Loans,
205 P.3d 389, 405-06 (Colo. App. 2008), In re W. Sky Fin., 2011 WL 1540518 (MD Comm. Fin. Reg., 2011)).
292. People v. Miami Nation Enterprises, 324 P.3d 834 (Cal. 2014). Review had been granted by the California Supreme Court with final determination still pending as of this writing.
293. See Petrovich, supra note 285, at 343.
294. See Part III supra.
295. See Parts I and III supra.
296. See Part II supra.
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steps to protect consumers from unreasonably high interest rates. Nevertheless, lenders that provide consumer loans in violation of state usury laws have thrived by managing to sidestep state regulations through the loopholes provided in federal law discussed in Part II supra. But even when federal law does not preempt state usury
statutes, lenders can also exploit loopholes in state laws to circumvent state usury
statutes.297
V. PAYDAY LENDERS
No type of loan today poses a greater challenge for states who want to impose
rate caps on consumer borrowing than payday loans.298 Nor is any other type of loan
shrouded in so much controversy due largely to three factors: 1. the extremely high
effective interest rates that these loans impose on consumers;299 2. the vulnerable
nature of the target consumer for these loans;300 and 3. the business model that intentionally seeks to trap consumers with very limited resources into a cycle of borrowing
from which they have great difficulty in extricating themselves.301
Payday loans are short-term loans that carry extremely high interest rates offered
to consumers with a pressing need for cash.302 As an example, a consumer with overdue utility bills whose next paycheck is two weeks away goes to a payday lender who
provides a $300 loan due in two weeks and charges a $90 interest fee for an effective
annual interest rate of 780 percent.303 Two weeks later, when the loan is due, the
consumer is unable to repay it, and the lender renews the loan, with the cycle repeating itself throughout the next year, at the end of which the consumer has paid $1,800
in interest and still owes the entire original $300 principal.304
Payday loans are loans intended to tide a consumer over to their next paycheck
when the need for cash arises and can be described as “small, short-term, triple-digit

297. See generally Creola Johnson, America’s First Consumer Financial Watchdog is on a Leash: Can the
CFPB Use its Authority to Declare Payday-Loan Practices Unfair, Abusive, and Deceptive?, 61 CATH. U. L.
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298. Allison S. Woolston, Note, LAW & POLICY NOTE: Neither Borrower Nor Lender Be: The Future of
Payday Lending in Arizona, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 853, 870 (2010) (noting that in New York vigorous criminal
prosecution of state usury laws has been very effective at stamping out payday lenders in the state, but that
usury statutes are meaningless without aggressive enforcement)
299. See Center for Responsible Lending, Paydayand Other Small Dollar Loans, http://www.responsiblelending.org/issues/payday-other-small-dollar-loans (last visited december 30, 2015) (noting that payday loan
carry an average annual interest rate of 391 percent).
300. Zoe Elizabeth Lees, Note, Payday Peonage: Thirteenth Amendment Implications in Payday Lending,
15 SCHOLAR 63, 65 (2012) (noting that the payday loan industry thrives at the expense of millions of underclass,
economically impoverished Americans without the means to escape their economic condition).
301. Katie Jory, Note, Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in Payday Lending Loans: How the Federal Courts
Protect Unfair Lending Practices in the Name of Anti-Protectionism, 24 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 315, 318
(2009) (noting that the payday loan industry depends on chronic loan flippers, with nearly 90 percent of the
industry’s lending revenues coming from fees from borrowers who are trapped in a cycle of debt).
302. Creola Johnson, Payday Loans: Shrewd Business or Predatory Lending?, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1, 2
(2002).
303. Id.
304. Id.

60

Journal of Legislation

[Vol. 42:1

interest rate loan, typically in the range of $200 to $500 dollars, secured by the consumer’s post-dated check or debit authorization.”305 This gives payday lenders significant leverage over borrowers beyond that enjoyed by other lenders since borrowers know that the full amount of the loan will be automatically deducted from their
checking account through an electronic transfer (or a post-dated check deposited by
the lender on the loan’s due date) triggering bank overdraft or bounced check fees.
In addition, bad check statutes in many states allow a payday lender to sue for treble
damages rather than just the cost of the loan and other associated collection costs.306
And writing a bad check when one knows there are insufficient funds to cover it can
also subject the drawer to criminal prosecution.307 This provides payday lenders with
a competitive advantage over other lenders that allows them to use threats of both
civil and criminal prosecutions as a means of ensuring collection.308 It also provides
leverage to coerce borrowers to extend their loans for another term when they are
unable to pay the full amount of the loan to avoid civil and criminal penalties, as well
as bank fees for bounced checks. And it helps payday lenders to trap consumers into
a cycle of debt that extends far beyond the original short-term of the loan. According
to the Center for Responsible Lending, 90 percent of the revenue for payday loan
businesses is generated by borrowers who cannot pay off their loans when due, and
the typical payday borrower pays $793 for a $325 loan.309
Payday lenders essentially apply the same business model as loan sharks, namely
providing loans of typically relatively small amounts for short periods of time at very
high interest rates intended to trap the consumer into a cycle of borrowing.310 For
both payday lenders and criminal loan sharks, the intent is to keep lenders paying
interest only on these loans while rolling over the full principal amount as many times
as possible.311 And loan sharks who form part of a criminal enterprise in Las Vegas
have traditionally charged lower interest rates at five percent per week than their
counterparts making legal payday loans.312 Both those who defend and those who
attack the payday loan industry agree on the importance of repeat customers for payday lenders, and some lenders offer incentives and loyalty programs to encourage
borrowers to become repeat customers.313

305. Nathalie Martin, 1,000% Interest—Good While Supplies Last: A Study of Payday Loan Practices and
Solutions, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 563, 564 (2010).
306. Michael A. Satz, How the Payday Predator Hides Among Us: The Predatory Nature of the Payday
Loan Industry and its Use of Consumer Arbitration to Further Discriminatory Lending Practices, 20 TEMP.
POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 123, 132 (2010).
307. 32 AM JUR 2d False Pretenses § 62 (“bad check” statutes).
308. Pearl Chin, Note, Payday Loans: The Case for Federal Legislation, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 723, 732
(2004).
309. Center for Responsible Lending, Financial Quicksand: Payday lending sinks borrowers in debt with
$4.2 billion in predatory fees every year, http://www.responsiblelending.org/research-publication/financialquicksand-payday-lending-sinks-borrowers-debt-4-2-billion-predatory (last visited December 30, 2015).
310. Robert Mayer, Loan Sharks, Interest-Rate Caps, and Deregulation, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 807, 812
(2012).
311. Id. at 815.
312. Chin, supra note 308, at 728.
313. See Martin, supra note 305, at 573.

2016]

Journal of Legislation

61

VI. THE NEED TO PROTECT CONSUMERS FROM PREDATORY LENDERS
There is no doubt that loans that carry extraordinarily high effective rates of interest will remain controversial. It is reasonable to expect that fringe lenders who
issue loans without regard to the credit worthiness of their clients will charge a high
rate of interest in order to defray the high risk of default.314 But for these high interest
rates, there might be no other recourse for borrowers of limited means in need of fast
cash in an emergency situation. Reasonable people may differ on whether the high
cost of payday loans and similar fringe credit market products are attributable to the
higher risk of making such loans to sub-prime consumers or to the unbridled greed
of lenders who offer a product at the highest cost that the market will bear. Fringe
banking is certainly a profitable business that has grown from nearly nothing to a
$100 billion dollar industry over a period of two decades with more check cashing
and payday businesses in the U.S. today than McDonald’s, Burger King, Target,
Sears, JCPenney, and Wal-Mart locations combined.315
There is some disturbing evidence that fringe credit market lenders such as payday lenders unfairly target communities of color with predatory loans that have a
disparate impact on these communities.316 There is also evidence of a disparate impact on women317 and on the elderly.318 The empirical evidence as to the impact of
payday loans is inconclusive, but many local governments are convinced that payday
lenders do more harm than good in their communities.319 As a result, many municipalities have adopted moratoria on the development of new payday businesses and
imposed land used restrictions on where payday lenders may locate in an attempt to
stem the proliferation of these businesses.320 But under current federal law, both
states and local municipalities are powerless to control the interest charged by payday
lenders who are affiliated with nationally chartered banks or Native-American tribes,
even when that affiliation is tenuous at best as in the rent-a-tribe and rent-a-bank
schemes.321
One might argue that if predatory loans are being offered to consumers at exorbitant rates through unfair marketing practices relief could always be found at the
local small claims court under a claim to set aside loan agreements as unconscionable.
But this option is also denied consumers by loan agreements that require binding
arbitration and prevent consumers having their case heard in a court of law.322 Class
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action waivers are also often contained in these agreements.323
VII. CONCLUSION
Throughout our history, the states protected their citizens against unreasonably
high interest rates through usury statutes.324 Most states today attempt to protect their
citizens through usury statutes that define the outer limits of what state legislatures
find to be reasonable interest rates and fees that may be exacted by lenders.325 These
statutes reflect the diversity one finds among the states, and a judgment made by the
governing authorities under their plenary police powers of what is in the best interest
of their citizens. There is no question that the federal government could regulate the
payday loan industry or impose a general maximum interest rate cap, and some commentators have called for Congress to do just that.326
Payday lenders and other sub-prime lenders will continue to use the loopholes
provided by federal law to flaunt state usury statutes until Congress addresses the
issue. Given that it is federal law and federal preemption that have severely limited
the ability of states to effectively protect their citizens from predatory loans, it is not
unreasonable to call on Congress to provide a solution. One possible obvious solution
is for Congress to extent the same protection to all American consumers that it did to
military personnel and their families by imposing a maximum interest rate of 36 percent on all consumer loans.327 This is perhaps the easiest solution, though it would
create other serious issues, including imposing a federal interest rate cap on states
that do not currently place a cap on interest rates, or have higher caps than Congress
might impose. At the very least, Congress should address the most egregious problems caused by lenders in the sub-prime credit markets that include payday loans. It
could impose the same 36 percent cap currently applicable to loans to military personnel at least to all consumer loans below a certain dollar threshold (e.g., $1,000).
It would also need to specifically make the interest cap applicable to lenders owned
by or chartered by Native American tribes to borrowers outside of tribal lands to close
that particular loophole.
A national poll of likely 2016 voters conducted in January 2015 shows very
strong support for caps on payday loans among Democrat, Republican and Independent voters.328 Among those polled, 61 percent of Democrats, 62 percent of Republicans and 58 percent of Independents had an unfavorable or very unfavorable view of
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2016]

Journal of Legislation

63

payday lenders.329 79 percent of Democrats, 75 percent of Republicans and 77 percent of Independents supported or strongly supported imposing rate caps on payday
lenders.330 The electorate is clearly united in its support for rate caps, at least on payday loans. At a time in our history when even the most casual of observers cannot
fail to notice a lack of bipartisanship in Congress and a concomitant lack of cooperation between the legislative and executive branches, it would seem that an issue that
appears to have overwhelming support from Democrat, Republican and Independent
voters should merit serious attention. It could provide a salutary opportunity for the
legislative and executive branches of government to work together to resolve a problem that the vast majority of the electorate across party affiliations seems to think
should be resolved. Political expediency aside, Congress should address the current
undermining of state usury statutes by federal law and promote the ends of justice by
protecting everyone everywhere in the United States from predatory loans just as it
has our men and women in uniform and their families.
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